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I.
Introduction
Robert Kagan's Of Paradiseand Power: America andEurope in
the New World Order, appearing first in shorter form as an essay in
Policy Review in Summer 2002,' was expanded because of its immense
popularity into a 102-page book examining the growing "ideological
gap' '2 in the way Europe and the United States view world politics.
Kagan begins in his chapter "The Power Gap" by placing Europe and the
United States in their respective historical contexts. Whereas post World
War II Europe was both weak and anxious to forget its bloody past, the
United States emerged from the war strong and dominating. 3 Against
this background, Kagan proposes in his chapter "Psychologies of Power
and Weakness" that "Europe's relative weakness has understandably
produced a powerful European interest in building a world where
military strength and hard power matter less than economic and soft
power."4 After further elaborating on American strength and European
weakness in the context of the Kosovo conflict in his chapter
* JD, University of Michigan Law School, expected May 2005; Fulbright

Scholar, Morocco, 2003-04; BA, Magna Cum Laude, The Colorado College,
1997. The author thanks Tim Kuhner and Trent Thompson for their insight. All
errors are the author's alone.
'Robert Kagan, Power and Weakness, POL'Y REv., June-July 2002, at 3.

2 ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER: AMERICA AND EUROPE IN THE

NEW WORLD ORDER 11 (2003).

'4 Id. at 12-18.
1d at 37.
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"Hyperpuissance," 5 Kagan proposes the central thesis of his book in his
chapters "The Postmodern Paradise" and "The World America Made,"
that "Europe's evolution into its present state occurred under the mantle6
of the U.S. security guarantee and could not have occurred without it."
Having established this thesis about Europe's past, Kagan then focuses
on the present in his chapter "Is it Still 'The West?"' Noting that
European strategy and interests focus increasingly around the European
Union and less around the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, he
questions whether it is still possible to view Europe and the United States
as a cohesive unit under such titles as "The West."' 7 Finally, he turns to
the future in "Adjusting to Hegemony," concluding that the only way to
resolve the ideological differences between norm-based Europe and
militarily-strong United States is for Europe to simply "readjust to the
new reality of American hegemony." '
It is easy to see why Kagan's book was so popular. It is an
important, controversial, and thought-provoking book whose content
transcends many disciplines, including international relations, political
science, history, and world politics. But, one discipline is notably
lacking from Kagan's analysis-that of international law. It is therefore
the purpose of this book review to provide a counterpoint to Kagan's
approach-an approach wholly based in international relations theoryby offering a response based in international law.
Part II responds to Kagan's perception of power using the
assumptions of international law, and it contrasts his definition of power
to that of several international legal scholars. Part III places Kagan's
realist approach in a broader context of international relations
(hereinafter "IR") and international law (hereinafter "IL") theory. It
begins with a discussion of challenges to realism and concludes with an
examination of the growing body of literature which posits that the fields
of international law and international relations are merging (hereinafter
"integrationist" literature). Part IV returns to the question of power,
examining ways in which Kagan's book challenges international lawyers
to consider how military and doctrinal power interact, an inquiry which
is particularly interesting in the European context, where doctrinal power
is stronger than military power. The review concludes in Part V,
agreeing with Kagan that the current rift between the United States and
5 Id. at

42-53.
6 Id at 72.
7
1d at 85.
8
Id. at 97.
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Europe is likely to grow, but disagreeing on the result. Whereas Kagan
foresees a world where the all-powerful U.S. eventually disregards
Europe, its former friend who is no longer of any strategic use to U.S.
interests, this review foresees a world where the powerful rules-based
society of the European Union will continue to grow, creating a potent
counter-balance to the United States.
II.

Varying Conceptions of Power: An International Law
Response
As the title suggests, Kagan's book examines the different
notions of power in the United States and Europe. But, although Kagan
presents himself as a relatively neutral observer, 9 his entire book is
written from the perspective of an American realist international
relations scholar.' 0 An equally valid and academically rich set of
assumptions about the meaning of "power" exists within the discipline of
international law. When Kagan's topics are re-examined under this
alternative paradigm, a vastly different picture emerges. This Part reexamines the notion of power from an IL perspective, concluding that
because Europeans may view the world more like an international lawyer
and less like Kagan, his conclusions regarding European policy choices
surrounding military power may also need to be re-examined.
Kagan states that Europe's "mission, if it has a mission beyond
the confines of Europe, is to oppose power."" But this assertion is
heavily laden with Kagan's own definition of power which permeates his2
book. To Kagan, there is only one type of power: military power.'
9Kagan claims that "as an American living in Europe" it is easier for him to see
the contrast between the American and European international approaches. Id.
at4.
10 David P. Calleo, Power, Wealth and Wisdom, NAT'L INT., Summer 2003, at 5
("The book is well worth reading, not least for insight into what the intelligent
and civilized American neo-conservative thinks about the world.").
11KAGAN, supra note 2, at 68.
12 See, e.g., id. at 33 (minimizing the influence of "soft" economic power
compared to "hard" military power); id. at 38 (using the general term "weak" to
mean "militarily weak" and the general term "strong" to imply military
strength); id. at 41 (claiming Europeans are not "wielding power" because they
are not wielding military power). Realists have been criticized for their narrow
conception of power in the past. For example, Martti Koskenniemi notes that
realists "fail to see to what extent their determining concepts such as 'interest,'
'power,' or 'security' are themselves defined and operative within a normative
context." Martti Koskenniemi, The Place of Law in Collective Security, 17
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However, many international lawyers disagree with this narrow
definition of power, preferring a much broader definition of power, such
as the following offered by Professor Byers:
Power is the ability of one actor to compel or
significantly influence the behavior of another. It may be
applied through the use or threat of force, through
economic incentives or penalties, or through a variety of
social pressures. It may be derived from a number of
different sources, including military capabilities, wealth
or moral authority. It may be augmented or constrained
by concepts, values, institutions and rules. It is above all
a relational concept, in that the ability to compel or
influence always depends on the relative abilities of the
different actors concerned either to apply or resist
pressure. 13
See also Joseph Nye, America's Soft
Learning Curve, ECONOMIST, Dec. 18, 2004-Jan. 1, 2005, at 61, 62 (spec. annual
ed. 2004) (arguing that the United States should pay more attention to the soft
power of rules and persuasion, that it was through such soft power that the
United States won the Cold War, and that only though such soft power can the
MICH. J. INT'L L. 455, 465 (1996).

United States can win the war on terrorism).
13 Michael Byers, Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules: Customary
International Law from an InterdisciplinaryPerspective, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L.

109, 113 (1995). Professor Anne Orford criticizes Byers' work for not
acknowledging that "the work of international relations and international legal
scholars in describing and explaining the world is itself an exercise of power,
rather than a mere observation of the way in which powerful actors such as
'sovereign states' behave." See Anne Orford, Positivism and the Power of
International Law: Custom, Power and the Power of Rules: International
Relations and Customary InternationalLaw by Michael Byers, 24 MELB.U. L.
REv. 502, 520 (2000) (review essay). Orford broadens the discussion of power
yet again:
The work of feminist scholars, postcolonial scholars and queer
theorists provides a way of thinking about the relationship
between sovereignty and the operation of power in modern
societies that differs from that developed by positivists. The
model of power that emerges from these areas departs from a
conception of power as a commodity or thing held by
particularly powerful entities like states. Scholars in those
fields have been arguing for decades that apparently
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While Paul Kahn of the Yale Law School notes the importance
of power in international affairs, he also cautions against viewing power
and law as opposites:
When we compare the international to the domestic
order, the balance between power and law tilts
dramatically in favor of power-meaning the capacity to
advance state ends independently of the norms and
procedures of law. Many contemporary observers,
however, believe that this situation is rapidly changing,
as international law gains normative strength and
institutional presence. This opposition of power and
law-and the trade-off between them-offers too simple
a view of the relationship between these concepts. This
is not just because a great power may often find it in its
interests to support the international legal order. That is
no doubt true, but it still assumes that power and law can
be measured against each other, i.e., on a single scale of
state interests. The situation we confront, 4 however,
challenges the idea that any such scale exists.1
Furthermore, some human rights lawyers would find Kagan's
notion of sovereignty--on which his idea of military power is based-to
be somewhat simplistic in the modem international order.' 5 After tracing
the development of international law from post-World War II statecentered positivism to the development of the individual-centered
international human rights movement,1 6 Professor Kahn suggests that it
organizational and public issues, such as militarism,
imperialism, law and monetarism, are deeply personal, while
the personal issues of subjectivity and experience are deeply
political.
Id. at 522.
14 Paul W. Kahn, American Hegemony and InternationalLaw. Speaking Law to
Power: Popular Sovereignty, Human Rights, and the New InternationalOrder,
1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (2000).

5 Id. at6.
Id at 10-16. According to Kahn:

16

For a long time, this combination of views fit easily into the
reigning dualist paradigm of international law. On this view,
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is the latter development, international human rights based outside of or
antithetical to the concept of popular sovereignty, 7 which left the United
States in an impossible position with respect to international law:
"[W]hile law functions in the United States as an expression of popular
sovereignty that chooses to invest itself in particular rights, contemporary
international law has little to do with popular sovereignty and gains its
legitimacy from the defense of rights."' 8 Viewed in light of Kahn's
analysis, Kagan is correct that the United States fears usurpation of its
sovereignty. But, rather than frame the issue as a divide between the
United States and Europe, it is more accurately framed within the global
growth and increased importance of international human rights law. 19 To
do this, however, is to admit the importance of international lawsomething Kagan is unwilling to do.

the origin of international law was the consent of states.
Although the modes of expression varied across the domestic
and international contexts, both contexts shared the idea that
law expressed the sovereign will. This era of international law
is ending. The language of the international law scholar today
is no longer the language of sovereignty; rather, it is that of the
demise of sovereignty. The sovereign state is increasingly
perceived as the problem to be overcome.
Id. at 5.

17Id. at

12 ("The rhetoric of human rights provided a legal ground by which to
overcome claims of state sovereignty.").
8 Id.
at 6.
19 Id. at 14. This theory is consistent with recent scholarly work on neoliberalism. See infra note 73 and accompanying text. Christian Reus-Smit
notes:
Because liberal theory stresses the primacy of individuals and
private groups in shaping political and legal outcomes, the
traditional ordering of international law, which privileges the
international public law of interstate relations, is turned on its
head, with law that directly regulates individuals and groups
(the first two tiers) taking precedence. Furthermore, within
international public law, law that most directly affects
individual-state relations is given priority, thus placing human
rights law at the 'core' of international law.
Christian Reus-Smit, The Strange Death of Liberal International Relations
Theory, 12 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 573, 586 (2001).
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Unfortunately, Kagan's assumptions about power permeate even
his analysis of European policy choices surrounding military power,
leading to some potentially erroneous conclusions. For example, one of
Kagan's primary arguments, presented in his chapter "Psychologies of
Power and Weakness," is that "Europe's relative weakness has
understandably produced a powerful European interest in building a
world where military strength and hard power matter less than economic
and soft power., 20 But, this argument is contradicted by Kagan himself,
who concedes that Europeans could quite easily increase their military
budgets to meet or even exceed that of the United States, but that they
choose not to do so. 2 1 Similarly, Kagan asks, "If Europe's strategic
20

KAGAN,

supra note 2, at 37. Kagan appeals to a popular audience by making

this argument through a series of simplistic analogies in which the complexities
of interstate relations are personified. For example, he employs a "Wild West
analogy," where the United States is the "sheriff' and Europe is the
"saloonkeeper."
According to Kagan, "[O]utlaws shoot sheriffs, not
saloonkeepers. In fact, from the saloonkeeper's point of view, the sheriff trying
to impose order by force can sometimes be more threatening than the outlaws,
who, at least for the time being, may just want a drink." Id. at 36. Similarly, he
contrasts a "man armed only with a knife" who "may decide that a bear
prowling the forest is a tolerable danger," with "[tihe same man armed with a
rifle" who "will likely make a different calculation of what constitutes a
tolerable risk." Id. at 31. He even attempts to link Saddam Hussein to the
September 11th terrorist attacks and glosses the fact that no weapons of mass
destruction have been found in Iraq. Id.
21 Id. at 53-54 ("Europe today has the wealth and technological capability
to
make itself more of a world power in military terms if Europeans wanted to
become that kind of world power. They could easily spend twice as much as
they are currently spending on defense if they believed it necessary to do so.")
(emphasis added). Similarly, as part of a comprehensive study of European
military prospects and economic constraints, researchers at RAND Corporation

found that "the prevailing European view appears to be that there are realistic
opportunitiesfor reallocation within existing patterns of military spending and
military investments, thereby allowing for shifting resourcesfrom the existing
pool of military procurement without a need for additional resources."
CHARLES WOLF, JR. & BENJAMIN ZYCHER, EUROPEAN MILITARY PROSPECTS,
ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS, AND THE RAPID REACTION FORCE 23 (2001),

available at http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MRI416/ (last visited Jan.
26, 2005) [hereinafter "RAND study"]. The RAND study, although cautious in
its analysis, nevertheless confirms that Europe can, without major policy
changes, increase its military budget in accordance with the European Union's
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP):
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culture today places less value on hard power and military strength and
more value on such soft-power tools as economics and trade, isn't 22
it
partly because Europe is militarily weak and economically strong?,
But, Kagan's question puts the cart before the horse. Europe does not
prefer "soft" power because it is militarily weak; it chooses to be
militarily weak because it prefers "soft" power. Comparatively low
military spending in Europe is not necessarily European acquiescence to
an American-provided security umbrella; at least a portion of this
political choice must be attributed to entrenched European beliefs about
the adequacy of international law to promote peace and security.2 3

[I]f at least one-third of the present allocations for annual
military investments is shifted and reallocated to the
procurement needs associated with the ESDP/RRF, then by
2010 sufficient funding would be available to meet the
estimated capital costs of the force... [Slavings from increased
efficiency in the defense industry and from movement toward
a single defense market in the EU would contribute
additionally, if modestly, to defraying the necessary capital
costs.
Id. at 35-36.
22 KAGAN, supra note 2, at 33. Kagan commits this same flaw in logic
repeatedly. See, e.g., id. at 31-32 ("Europeans like to say that Americans are
obsessed with fixing problems, but it is generally true that those with a greater
capacity to fix problems are more likely to try to fix them than those who have
no such capability."); Id. at 40 ("Those who cannot act unilaterally themselves
naturally want to have a mechanism for controlling those who can."); Id. at 38
("Since Europeans lack the capacity to undertake unilateral military actions,
either individually or collectively as 'Europe,' it is natural that they should
oppose allowing others to do what they cannot do themselves."). Kagan also
commits the same logical fallacy in reverse, assuming that American military
participation is a result of American military capacity, instead of a geo-political
world view that favors military intervention: "Americans know that when
international crises erupt, whether in the Taiwan Strait or in Kashmir, they are
likely to be the first to become involved." Id. at 35.
23 This is consistent with the premise of liberal international relations theory.
See infra notes 72-75 and accompanying text. Moravcsik, an IR liberal, states
that, "[a]mong advanced industrial democracies, a stable form of interstate
politics has emerged, grounded in reliable expectations of peaceful change,
domestic rule of law, stable international institutions, and intensive societal
interaction.
This is the condition Deutsch terms a 'pluralistic security
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From Kagan's "intelligent and civilized American neoconservative" 24 viewpoint, it is unthinkable that social welfare budgets
would ever take priority over defense spending, 25 and it is with this
assumption that Kagan builds his hypothesis that Europe channels its
money into social welfare only because the United States has eliminated
the "primary" concern of security.26 Kagan appears so firmly rooted in
his beliefs that he mistakenly attributes them to the Europeans he is
attempting to analyze. As Calleo notes, if the European strategists were
operating with American neo-conservative assumptions and values,
Kagan's argument based on security and military force would be a
plausible explanation for European actions. 27 But, Europeans are not
American neo-conservatives. 28 It is equally plausible to take their
actions at face value. Perhaps Europeans care more about social welfare

community' and Keohane and Nye term 'complex interdependence."' Andrew
Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International
Politics,51 INT'L ORG. 513, 535 (1997).
24 Calleo, supra note 10, at 5.
25 KAGAN, supra note 2, at 54 n.39 ("Europeans insist that there are certain
structural realities in their national budgets, built-in limitations to any significant
increases in defense spending. But if Europe were about to be invaded, ..
would they insist nevertheless that their social welfare programs be left
untouched?").
16 Id. at 25.
27 Calleo, supra note 10, at 2. Calleo writes:
The role [Kagan] assigns Europe in the newest American
century may seem satisfactory in Washington and perhaps in
London, but it does not appear to go down well in Paris or
Berlin, nor in Moscow or Beijing.
Kagan's argument
nevertheless seems powerful at home, but less because of its
conclusions than its premises. These premises reflect a variety
of interlocking assumptions widely shared among American
foreign policymakers and analysts. We should be grateful to
Kagan for demonstrating these assumptions so forcefully and
showing just where they lead. Those uneasy with his
triumphalist conclusions might therefore start by re-examining
his triumphalist assumptions.
Id
28

Id. ("What Europeans see as prudent self restraint, neo-conservative

Americans count as pusillanimous diffidence.").
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programs than security, 29 and their decision to allocate a relatively small
budget to defense while allocating a relatively large budget to social
spending is a political choice by the European electorate, influenced by a
moral vision about both international peace and domestic social
welfare-in other words, something completely disconnected from U.S.
action. 30 Rather than strategically attempting "to capitalize on a sizeable
peace dividend," as Kagan argues, 3 1 it is equally plausible that Europeans
simply possess different values. In other words, it is possible that,
regardless of how much "free security" the U.S. supposedly provided
Europe, Europeans still would have made similar allocations towards
social welfare and away from military spending because that is what they
value most.
This choice to focus on international peace and domestic social
welfare is illogical if made under Kagan's assumptions about power and
security, but it is legitimate if Europeans believe, as the international
lawyer does, that cooperation through international law actually has the
potential to prevent armed conflict-that rules do matter. 32 Professor
Byers offers an alternative explanation as to why many states, including
European states, prefer rules-based power to military force:
Discussing potential funding sources for increased European military activity,
researchers at RAND Corporation note that a "source could, in principle, be
reallocations in existing government budgets from nondefense to defense
29

purposes-for example, from . . . various entitlements. It goes without saying
that our European interlocutors were even more emphatic in rejecting this
option as unrealistic,so we omit it from the discussion." RAND study, supra

note 21, at 33 (emphasis added). Similarly, German interlocutors interviewed
by RAND corporation "emphasized that paying down Germany's public debtswollen by the burden of financing reunification costs-is a higher-priority
claimant for budgetary resources than is any addition to military spending." Id.
at 23.
30 This being said, as Europe begins to balance its strong doctrinal
power with
some form of European defense force, see infra Part IV, the political choice of

where to allocate funds is also likely to balance more evenly between social
welfare and defense. See Robert Graham, FranceSeeks to Reassure US over
NATO Commitment, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2003, at 7 (quoting French Defense
Minister Mich~le Alliot-Marie: "Today we have to realise that defence spending
is not a luxury but a necessity; and you cannot spend one year, then cut back the
next.").
31 KAGAN, supra note 2, at 25.
32 See, e.g., Kahn, supra note 14, at 4 ("While the Europeans are pursuing
a
deeper and deeper integration within the Union, the American political
imagination remains strictly parochial.").
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On occasion [states] may apply raw, unsystematized
power in the pursuit of a short-term goal. However, the
application of raw power promotes instability and
escalation, and is not particularly subtle or efficient.
More frequently, states will apply power within the
framework of an institution or legal system. States
develop and utilize institutions and legal systems
because they create expectations of behavior, which
lessens the risk of escalation and facilitates efficiency of
action, and because they promote stability, thus
protecting states, which recognize that they could find
themselves on the opposite side of an issue in future
situations. 3
Similarly, Professor Hudec notes that "[g]overnments... usually
have a longer - term [sic] interest in the efficacy of the legal
relationships they have established with other governments, and so they
are more inclined to act in ways designed to preserve those relationships.
Ultimately, the compliance decisions of governments are determined
more by calculatedself-interest than by force. 34

33

Byers, supra note 13, at 122 (citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 235-

43 (1st ed. 1971).
34 Robert E. Hudec, The Adequacy of WTO Dispute Settlement Remedies: A
Developing Country Perspective, in DEVELOPMENT, TRADE, AND THE WTO: A
HANDBOOK 81, 82 (Bernard Hoekman et al. eds., 2002) (emphasis added).
Professor Kritsiotis of the University of Michigan Law School makes the same
point:
[I]ntemational law offers a much more constructive
communicative medium (with all the prospects and risks that
this entails) than naked power could ever hope to do. Its very
rules promise peace; they preach pacifism. Compared with
power, its old rival, international law creates the conditions for
a genuine peace (based on negotiation and cooperation rather
than threat, intimidation, and force) and a stable peace (which
is protected by law and not by the balance of power). This
peace is the platform for the prosperity of the system's
participants.
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Rather than operating under American neo-conservative
assumptions that military defense is inviolable and explaining European
action based on this assumption, Europeans are operating with an
entirely different assumption altogether: that the best and most lasting
guaranty for international peace and security is cooperation through
international law. 35 Viewed from this alternative perspective (that of
international law), one could completely reverse Kagan's conclusion that
Dino Kritsiotis, Specific Applications: The Power of International Law as
Language, 34 CAL. W. L. REv. 397, 404 (1998). Similarly, Kahn observes:

Both internationally and domestically, political power operates
at the origins of law--for example, within legislatures or treaty
negotiations. But, for both, the move from political
disagreement to legal resolution represents a shift of norms
from inequality to equality. Once the legal rules are set,
outcomes should not depend on the relative power of the
disputants. To identify the operation of political power within
an institution of law is to discover a 'defect,' a site at which
reform must be pursued if the values of law are to be
maintained.
See also Kahn, supra note 14, at 1.
35 See, for example, Id. at 15-16:

The moral content of international relations is being absorbed
by claims of legal right, leaving less and less room for a
morally driven politics outside of law. The United States still
wants a moral discourse that is not a legal discourse. To the
rest of the world, however, this insistence on both law and
power looks like a form of a discredited colonial discourse. To
them, the resistance of the United States to anything that looks
like a subordination of its own political center to international
legal institutions suggests that human rights law may be a
continuation of a Cold War political strategy, directed now at
the Third World.
To his credit, Kagan makes this point to some degree: "Europeans over the past
half century have developed a genuinely different perspective on the role of
power in international relations . . . . This is a perspective on power that
Americans do not and cannot share." KAGAN, supra note 2, at 55. But, far from
recognizing the intrinsic value of the rules-based European approach to
international affairs, Kagan fixates on the importance of American-provided free
security to the European project.
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a European insistence upon international law has hindered U.S. efforts to
promote peace militarily. 36 Instead, it is equally possible to view the
United States as a hindrance to European and international efforts to
promote peace doctrinally. Examples of such American obstruction
include sole "no" votes in the General Assembly, 37 sole "no" votes in the
Human Rights Commission,38 violating Security Council resolutions or
other international legal norms, 39 weakening the International Criminal
41
Court,40 disregarding a request of the International Court of Justice,
36

1d. at 51.

37 WILLIAM BLUM, ROGUE STATE 185-97 (2000) (cataloguing a sample of 139

UN General Assembly resolutions between 1978 and 1987 in which the U.S.
was either the sole "no" vote or was accompanied solely by Israel in its
opposition).
38

See, e.g., The Right to Food, U.N. ESCOR Comm'n on Human Rts., 59th

Sess., 56th mtg., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2003/25 (2003); The Right to Food,
U.N. ESCOR Comm'n on Human Rts., 57th Sess., 70th mtg., U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/RES/2001/25 (2001); The Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the
Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, U.N. ESCOR

Comm'n on Human Rts., 59th Sess., 56th mtg., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2003/28
(2003); World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination,Xenophobia
and Related Intolerance and the Comprehensive Implementation of and Followup to the DurbanDeclarationand Programme ofAction, U.N. ESCOR Comm'n

on Human Rts., 59th Sess., 57th mtg., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2003/30 (2003).

39 See, e.g., John Quigley, InternationalLaw Violations by the United States in

the Middle East as a Factor Behind Anti-American Terrorism, 63 U. PITT. L.
REV. 815 (2002); Amnesty Int'l, United States of America: Hypocracy or
Human Rights? Time to Choose, AI Index No. AMR 51/075/2002 (May 15,

2002), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engamr510752002 (last
visited Jan. 26, 2005) ("On 14 August 2000, the day that President Clinton told
his party that the USA was the most progressive force for human rights, the
U.N. Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights
affirmed that the use of the death penalty against child offenders-defendants
who were under 18 at the time of the crime-violated customary international
law. It called on offending countries to stop the practice. The U.S., failing to
stand firm for the rule of international law, has ignored such calls.").

See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, US. Proposals to Undermine the
InternationalCriminalCourt Through a UN. Security Council Resolution, June
40

25, 2002, at http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/icc/usproposal.htm (last visited Jan.
26, 2005); Human Rights Watch, The United States and the International

Criminal Court, at http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/icc/us.htm (last visited Jan.
26, 2005); Diane Marie Amann & M.N.S. Sellers, The United States of America
and the InternationalCriminal Court, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 381 (2002); Eric P.
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denying access to U.N. Special Rapporteur, 42 and failing to ratify43 or

severely limiting the effect 44 of human rights treaties. From this
international law perspective, far from painting the United States as the
"key," allowing Europe to pursue its agenda of international law, the
United States is rather the biggest obstacle-through passive ignorance
or active sabotage-of an international legal order to which an increasing
number of states subscribe.4 5 Against this background, Europe's position
Schwartz, The United States and the InternationalCriminal Court: The Casefor
"Dexterous Multilateralism",4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 223 (2003).
41 Pending review of the case by the International Court of Justice, on April 14,
1998, the governor of Virginia ignored a request of the International Court of
Justice to stay the execution of Breard, who was a Paraguayan citizen. The
governor found "no reason to interfere with his sentence" and proclaimed that
"the safety of those residing in the Commonwealth of Virginia is not the
responsibility of the International Court of Justice." See Jonathan Charney &
Michael Reisman, Agora: Breard: The Facts, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 666, 674-75
(1998).
42 In 1998, Radhika Coomaraswamy, UN Special Rapporteur on Violence
Against Women, was denied access to prisons in Virginia and Michigan. Report
of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and
consequences: Mission to the United States of America, U.N. ESCOR, 55th
Sess., Agenda Item 12(a) at 9, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/68/Add.2 (1999).
43 See, e.g., Paula Donnolo & Kim K. Azzarelli, Essay: Ignoring the Human
Rights of Children: A Perspective on America's Failure to Ratify the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 203 (1996); Julia

Ernst, US. Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 299 (1995); Philip
Alston, US. Ratification of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: The Needfor an Entirely New Strategy, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 365 (1990);
Amy C. Harfeld, Oh Righteous Delinquent One: The United States'
International Human Rights Double Standard-Explanation, Example, and
Avenue for Change, 4 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 59 (2001).
4 See Timothy K. Kuhner, Note, Human Rights Treaties in US. Law: The
Status Quo, Its Underlying Bases, and Pathwaysfor Change, 13 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT'L L. 419 (2003); Connie de la Vega, Civil Rights Duringthe 1990s: New
Treaty Law Could Help Immensely, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 423, 452-57 (1997)
(examining the Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations attached to the
ICCPR and CERD); Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, The Scope of
US. Senate Control Over the Conclusion and Operation of Treaties, 67 CHI.KENT L. REV. 571, 584-85 (1991) (discussing the Reservations, Understandings,
and Declarations to the ICCPR).
45 Kahn, supra note 2, at 18. Kahn states:
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is aptly summarized in the draft European Constitution, which says, "the
transatlantic relationship is 'irreplaceable' but also says the United
Nations charter is 'the fundamental framework for international
relations."46
Like any scholar, Kagan approaches his analysis from a
particular angle and with certain biases. Certainly, approaching these
same issues from the perspective of international law is no less biased.
But it is definitely complementary, a complementarity upon which
quality scholarship depends. Two weak points in Kagan's book,
therefore, are the lack of discussion of his disciplinary biases and the
missed opportunity to enhance his text by providing, and then refuting,
alternative views. This section has attempted to provide this missing
complementarity by re-examining the concept of power and the policy
choices related to it from an alternative perspective.
III.
The World Beyond Kagan's Realism
The notion of "power," as explored in Part II of Kagan's work, is
essentially limited to power supported by military force. 47 By repeatedly

Much of the world today is tired of the politics of nation-states
that has marked the modem era as one of deep and unrelenting
violence. The European Union confronts a large number of
states that want to enter, even though entry will require a
reordering of the relationship among the conceptions of state,
sovereignty, and law. Much of Latin America, too, has
experienced a disgust with the politics of the nation and is
turning toward a world of markets and international law. For
many who distrust their own national politics-a wholly
justified distrust in many parts of the world-the promise of
international law is its restraint on these domestic political
forces.
Id.
46 Thomas Fuller, E. U Leaders Agree on Defense Policy, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
Dec. 13-14, 2003, at 1.
4' Although Kagan consistently downplays political and economic power
to
military power, he at least acknowledges them as forms of power in their own
right, albeit insubstantial ones. KAGAN, supra note 2, at 21 ([I]in economic and
political realms, the European Union produced miracles."); Id. at 48 ("For all
Europe's great economic power and for all its success at achieving political
union, Europe's military weakness . . .produced diplomatic weakness and
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pairing the terms "international law" and "power" in syntactic
opposition, he implicitly rejects that international law, outside Europe, is
powerful at all. 48 This concept of law and power as opposites must be
taken for what it is: the limited view of one particular school of
international relations-realism. This post-World War I discipline,
dominated by scholars such as Hans Morgenthau, 49 George Kennan,
Georg Schwarzenberger, Reinhold Niebuhr, Arnold Wolfers and Robert
Strausz-Hupe, 50 believes
in the polarity of law and power, opposing one to the
other as the respective emblems of the domestic versus
the international realm, normative aspiration versus
positive description, cooperation versus conflict, soft
versus hard, idealist versus realist. Regardless of their
domestic colors, states in the international realm were
champions only of their own national interest. 'Law,' as
understood in the domestic sense, had no place in this
world. The only relevant laws were the 'laws of
politics,' and politics was 'a struggle for power."' 5
Thus, Kagan's point about the relevance of international law in a world
dominated by U.S. hegemony is a well-worn one; the post World-War II
realists were challenging the utility of international law in a world they
(like Kagan) viewed as controlled by power politics long before Of
Paradiseand Power. But, what Kagan does not acknowledge is the rich
scholarly dialogue which resulted from this original realist challenge, in

sharply diminished its political influence compared to that of the United
States.").
48 Id. at 73 (describing Europe's preference for international law as a "rejection
of power politics" rather than a different form of power); Id.at 95 (implying
military power when stating that "Americans ...remain realists in the limited
sense that they still believe in the necessity of power in a world that remains far
from perfection"); Id.
at 65 (equating "military power" and "global rule," which
are contrasted to "European integration"); Id.
at 41 ("Europeans hope to contain
American power without wielding power themselves.").
49 Reus-Smit, supra note 19, at 581 (citing HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS
AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE 5-18

(6th ed. 1985)).

Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, InternationalLaw and InternationalRelations
Theory: A DualAgenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205, 207 n.5 (1995).
51Id at 207 n.6.
50
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which international lawyers responded to the realists, 52 neo-realists
responded to them, 53 and regime theorists responded to the neorealists 54-all of which has been concisely
documented by Anne Marie56
Slaughter 55 and Christian Reus-Smit.
Without placing his realist ideology in this greater historical
context, not only is it difficult for Kagan to claim impartiality, but it is
also difficult for him to respond to the gamut of post-realist ideologies,
some of which have challenged realism significantly.57 For example, by
proving through empirical evidence in particular international crises that
international law could have verifiable compliance effect, scholars such
as Abram Chayes have forced realists to reconsider their premise that
international law was irrelevant to state behavior. 58 Louis Henkin made

Id. at 209-211. Anne Marie Slaughter notes that "[t]he chief legal or
jurisprudential response to the Realist challenge was the reconceptualization of
the relationship between international law and politics." The most important
effort came from Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell of the Yale Law
School, who "reinvented international jurisprudence, creating a comprehensive
framework within which international lawyers, retrained as public policy
experts, could use empirical data and theoretical insights from political science
52

and a range of other disciplines to ascertain and critique existing law .

.

. to

determine which law, or which system of laws, best furthers 'human dignity."'
Id. Some of McDougal's students, particularly Richard Falk, Saul Mendlovitz
and Burns Weston, expanded this work "from the perspective less of human
dignity than of systemic stability." Id.

Reus-Smit, supra note 19, at 581-582 (citing Preface to KENNETH WALTZ,
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979)).
54 Id. at 582-83.
55 Slaughter Burley, supra note 50, at 209-25.
56 Reus-Smit, supra note 19, at
577-89.
57 See generally INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983);
Kenneth Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for
International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335 (1989).
For a complete
examination of the evolution of IR scholarship, see Friedrich Kratochwil & John
G. Ruggie, InternationalOrganization:A State of the Art on an Art of the State,
40 INT'L ORG. 753, 754 (1986). For additional challenges to realism, including
post-modernism, critical theory, and constructivism, see Richard Price &
Christian Reus-Smit, Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and
Constructivism, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 259 (1998).
58 Slaughter Burley, supra note 50, at 213 n.34 (citing ABRAM
CHAYES, THE
CUBAN MISSILE CRISES (1974); THOMAS EHRLICH, CYPRUS, 1958-1967 (1974);
ROGER FISHER, POINTS OF CHOICE (1978)).
Harold Koh cites to further
scholarship establishing the compliance effect of international law in areas such
53
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the same point more broadly, arguing in his canonical work How Nations
Behave that "almost all nations observe almost all principles of
international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the
time."5 9
At the same time realism was being challenged, international
lawyers were forced to admit that state compliance, although common, is
not guaranteed, thus causing them to de-emphasize "the constraint
function of international law." 60 Indeed, this might have been the
downfall of international law were it not for the development of regime
theory. Keeping consistent with realist premises, Robert Keohane's
neoliberal institutionalist theory of regimes explained the "pervasiveness
and persistence" of norms ("regimes" in IR speak) 61 in international
politics, arguing that because regimes lower transaction costs, increase
information, reduce cheating, enhance the value of reputation, and
facilitate monitoring, they are useful to and frequently followed by selfinterested utility maximizing states.62 Although rules may not guaranty
compliance quite as much as international lawyers had hoped they
would, regime theory demonstrated that rules are more important to

as international trade, international adjudication, international human rights, and
international environmental law. Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey
InternationalLaw?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2599 n.2 (1997).
59 Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979).
61 Slaughter

Burley, supra note 50, at 212.
See id at 218.
62
[R]ules, as part of the environment faced by a state, exert an
60

impact on state behavior. They do so, in this view, not because
the norms they reflect persuade people that they should behave
differently. Rather, they alter incentives . . . . The revised
Restatement of American Foreign Relations Law emphasizes
state interests: "international law generally is largely observed
because violations directly affect the interests of states, which

are alert to deter, prevent, or respond to violations."
Robert 0. Keohane, Comment, InternationalRelations and InternationalLaw:
Two Optics, 38 HARV. INT'L L.J. 487, 490 (1997). See also Reus-Smit, supra

note 19, at 582-83; Slaughter Burley, supra note 50, at 218-20; Phillip R.
Trimble, InternationalLaw, World Order, and CriticalLegal Studies, 42 STAN.
L. REV. 811, 834 (1990) ("International law conditions the behavior of

participants and observers alike. It channels the ways in which officials think
about a given situation, and it organizes their responses.").

2004]

THE MANY FACES OF POWER

379

63
international strategizing than previously acknowledged.
The seed was
64
planted for an ongoing marriage between IL and IR.
Viewing international law as a mere tool in IR strategizing is a
dismal future for the discipline of international law, however. In this
regard, the most interesting scholarship being carried on today analyzes
IR and IL not as complementary, but as synergistic.6 5 Rather than
63

Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley notes that international lawyers had, however,

recognized this facilitative role of international law at least two decades before
Keohane's institutionalism.
Slaughter Burley, supra note 50, at 219-20
(including a valuable chart comparing regime theorists' notions of the functions
and benefits of international regimes with IL scholars' understandings of the
functions and benefits of international law).
64 This interrelation between the instrumentalist and normative roles of
international law is neatly summarized in Keohane, supra note 62. See also
Abbott, supra note 57; Kenneth Abbott, International Relations Theory,
InternationalLaw, and the Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal Conflicts 93
AM. J. INT'L L. 361 (1999). Professor Kritsiotis of the University of Michigan
Law School offers a modem restatement of regime theory, reformulating many
of the precepts of institutionalism from the standpoint of international law.
Kritsiotis focuses his analysis on the power of international law as a language
within international relations, "a new communicative medium which professes
to be: more peaceful in its outlook on solving problems; more economical as far
as human and financial resources are concerned; more secure in terms of the
answers and solutions it provides; and, finally, more inclusive of the participants
that make up the international system." Kritsiotis, supra note 34, at 398.
Kritsiotis states that the increased use of the language of international law
''opens up a series of fundamental and recurrent questions - about compliance
with and enforcement of the law - but it is the very existence, speaking and use
of legal language that allows us to ask (and answer) such questions in the first
place." Id. at 407. Kritsiotis believes that as international law is increasingly
used to frame international relations debates, its "language of law, principle,
precedent, and procedure" will eventually have an overwhelming effect,
resulting in "a radical new reality for the conduct of international relations." Id
at 398.
65 See, e.g., Byers, supra note 13, at 112 ("[S]eek[ing] to demonstrate that
increased movement between the two disciplines, while not necessarily leading
to better solutions to practical problems, may well lead to better understandings
of the international society in which we live."); Gerry Simpson, The Situation on
the International Legal Theory Front: The Power of Rules and the Rule of
Power, II EUR. J. INT'L. L. 439 (2000); Onuma Yasuaki, InternationalLaw in
and with International Politics: The Functions of International Law in
InternationalSociety, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 105 (2003); Judith Goldstein et al.,
Legalization and World Politics, 54 INT'L ORG. 385 (2000); MICHAEL BYERS,
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viewing IL as a tool for IR, like institutionalists (regime theorists) do, the
"new generation of interdisciplinary scholars[] '' 6 view both fields as
inseparably intertwined. One of the most interesting works is by
Professor Michael Byers, who attempts "to synthesize the two
67
perspectives into a general theory of customary international law."
Byers seeks to "explain[] the process of customary international
law as a social institution created and shaped by the shared
understandings and patterned behavior of self-interested states.
According to this theory, customary rules largely arise through the
application of power by states within a framework made up of the
customary process and a number of fundamental structural principles of
international law."68
His use of customary international law is a
particularly interesting avenue with which to approach the disciplines of
international law and international relations simultaneously because it
shows, unlike Kagan, the ways in which power is both manifested in and
created by international law. Byers "seeks to bring the study of power
within the scope of international legal scholarship in a way that does not
deny an important element of stability and determinacy to law. It might
also encourage some international relations scholars to regard
(2000); Anne-Marie Slaughter
et al., InternationalLaw and InternationalRelations Theory: A New Generation
of InterdisciplinaryScholarship,92 AM. J. INT'L L. 367 (1998). The synergistic
THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

relationship of IR and IL is also a major theme of the liberalist school. See infra
notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
66 Slaughter et al., supra note 65, at 373.
67 Byers, supra note 13, at 115-16. See also id. at 113 ("The customary process
gives weight to power because, rather than involving quasi-contractual
agreements, it concerns patterns of legally relevant behavior which, if not
effectively opposed, may develop into legal rules."). Byers adds, "Furthermore.
. the maintenance, development, or change of customary rules usually involves
a weighing of different amounts of supporting, ambivalent, and opposing
behavior. Power, and its relational nature, is therefore particularly important in
the process of customary international law." Id.
68 Id. at 111. See also Kritsiotis, supra note 34, at 402 ("Through the
use of the
law as language, we can then identify strands of opinio juris thought in state
behavior (that is, incidents in state practice) - an essential legal ingredient in the
creation of custom which, in turn, produces a normative system more reflective
of the interests of its addressees. With its extraordinary dynamic and
adaptability, custom is especially appropriate as a dialect of international law for
allowing states to respond to complex emergencies or unanticipated crises, or
perhaps to depart from treaty texts when appropriate.").
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international law as a constraint on the exercise of power which cannot
be ignored or changed in response to short-term interests., 69 After
analyzing four fundamental principles of international law, (the principle
of jurisdiction, the principle of personality, the principle of reciprocity,
and the principle of legitimate expectation), 70 Byers concludes, contrary
to Kagan's view, that "the customary process and certain fundamental
structural principles
of international law act to qualify applications of
71
state power.

Another powerful integrationist effort is the liberal school,
including the work of Anne-Marie Slaughter, Andrew Moravcsik,
Andrew S. Tulumello and Stepan Wood. These scholars have sought to
explain how "state-society relations-the relationship of states to the
domestic and transnational social context in which they are embeddedhave a fundamental impact on state behavior in world politics.

72

They

believe that "the configuration of state preferences matters most in world
politics-not, as realists argue, the configuration of capabilities and not,
as institutionalists (functional regime theorists) maintain, the
configuration of information and institutions. 7 3
By linking state
Byers, supranote 13, at 111.
149-79.
71Id. at 180. Reaching this result, Byers notes that
69

70Id.
at

[i]ntemational relations scholars who have previously
dismissed and derided the role of international law may wish
to reevaluate the accuracy of their essentially anarchical
picture of international society.
Similarly, for those
international relations scholars who have begun to explore the
role of international institutions and international law, the
ideas expressed in this article may confirm their intuitions and
encourage them to join international lawyers in a cooperative
study of the complex issues which separate, yet bind,
international politics to international law.
Id.

Moravcsik, supra note 23, at 513. See also Slaughter Burley, supra note 50;
Anne-Marie Slaughter, InternationalLaw in a World of LiberalStates, 6 EUR. J.
72

INT'L L. 503 (1995); Anne-Marie Slaughter, InterdisciplinaryApproaches to
International Economic Law: Liberal International Relations Theory and
International Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 717 (1995);
Slaughter et al., supra note 65.
73Moravcsik, supra note 23, at 513.
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preferences to individual preferences through the operation of domestic
political systems, liberals have attempted to explain several notable IR
phenomena, including the "democratic peace," or absence of war
between democratic states.74 The liberalist premise is integrationist
because of its emphasis on the causal importance of norms in IR, albeit
from a "bottom up" rather than "top down" perspective."
Professor Reus-Smit brings the discussion to another level,
positing that because integrationist theories such as Slaughter's are
"proudly positive and explicitly eschew normative reflection, [they] ...
amount[] not to bridge-building but to an attempt to draw international
law across the river on to the turf of American political science, in the
process losing much of what is distinctive and important about
international legal theory., 76
In essence, Reus-Smit has accused
Slaughter and her colleagues of the same error the institutionalists had
committed, trivializing international law by grounding an integrationist
theory too firmly in the assumptions of political science." He contrasts
this approach to the works of inter-war pre-realist scholars, which he
believes to be more similar than typically acknowledged. For example,
the prominent inter-war IR theorist E.H. Carr is "traditionally understood
to have called for a science of international politics . . . purged of the
utopianism of Wilsonian internationalism, 78 and is often considered the
nemesis of Norman Angell, portrayed as a "naive liberal
internationalist. '79
In reality, an effort to combine realism and
normativity was at the heart of both of their philosophies. While Carr
may have been known as a strict realist, he in fact "called for a science of
Slaughter Burley, supra note 50, at 225-26.
In other words, the liberalist school emphasizes the influence of domestic
norms and preferences on IR, not the influence of IL on domestic preferences..
76 Reus-Smit, supra note 19, at 590.
77 Id. (claiming that Slaughter's strategy "has been to work out from a particular
model of political science and conception of politics, and to treat legal
institutions, processes and norms as empirical data to be explained .... The
result is a liberal international legal theory that makes good political science, at
least from the perspective of the American mainstream, but normatively weak
international legal theory."). See also id at 593 ("Positive international relations
theory lacks the philosophical resources to inform the articulation of a mature
liberal theory of international law, a theory that coherently mediates between the
pragmatics of social and political circumstance, the practice of rule
interpretation,
and the prescription of new norms.").
7
1Id. at 577.
79
Id. at 578.
74
75
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international politics that blended realism and utopianism." 80 According
to Carr, "[I]ntemational relations will never be a mature science until it
recognizes the need to bring the empirical and the normative into
dialogue.",8' Also, contrary to common portrayal, Angell was not
ignorant of power politics and firmly recognized the need to compromise
realist and utopian tendencies:
It seems fatally easy to secure either one of two kinds of
action: that of the "practical man" who limits his
energies to securing a policy which will perfect the
machinery of war, and disregard anything else; or that of
the pacifist, who, persuaded of the brutality or
immortality of war, just leaves it at that, implying that
national defense is of no concern of his. What is needed
is the type of activity, which will include both halves of
the problem . . . To concentrate on either half to the
exclusion of the 8 other
half is to render the whole
2
problem insoluble.
According to Reus-Smit, the reason these two philosophically
opposed scholars could find so much common ground was because, in
the inter-war period, the underlying assumption of all theorists was that
political theory had to take account of both the instrumental and the
moral.83 After World War II, however, "there [was] a shift away from
the orientation of classical international theories, which confronted the
80 Id. at 573.
81 E.H. CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS' CRISIS:

Reus-Smit, supra note 19, at 579.

82 NORMAN ANGELL, THE GREAT ILLUSION

1919-1939 10 (2d ed. 1946), cited in
327-38 (1933), quoted in Reus-Smit,

supra note 19, at 579.
83 Reus-Smit, supra note 19, at 579-80 (noting that inter-war international
relations theorists "of both realist and liberal persuasions" recognized "the dual
nature of international relations as a political science: it was political in the
sense that it was expected to help provide solutions to the pressing political
dilemmas of the day, dilemmas in which the is and the ought were inextricably
intertwined; and in the sense that the analysis of international politics demanded
an appreciation of the relationship between brute material facts and debate about
the good."); id. at 575 ("[P]olitics is distinctive 'because it combines moral and
instrumental considerations in a form of deliberation that is neither strictly
instrumental nor strictly moral."') (citing RONALD BEINER, POLITICAL
JUDGMENT

151 (1983).
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political in all of its . . . complexities, towards 'neo-theories' of both
realist and liberal varieties, which have reduced international relations to
instrumental rationality, effectively abandoning political inquiry, and
forgone normative argument, abrogating political engagement."8 4 ReusSmit argues that, rather than attempting to conceptualize IL with a postwar IR lacking a normative dimension, a true integrationist theory must
re-espouse the conception of politics as a socially-constitutive normative
enterprise "that mediates between individual and group self-interest and
utility, on the one hand, and ethical conceptions of what is right and
good, on the other." 85 Although some would claim it unrealistic or even
anachronistic to revert to a 70-year-old political dialogue, 86 Reus-Smit's
effort to more carefully refine the integrationist project is outstanding
and will surely provide insight to many future integrationist scholars.
Finally, Anne-Marie Slaughter's "community of courts"
paradigm posits that, whereas European and American foreign policy
may be moving farther apart, their judicial systems are increasingly in
dialogue.8 7 Increased judicial comity, "deference not to foreign law or
foreign national interests, but specifically to foreign courts," 88 could
create another avenue toward the union of IR and IL. The United States
judicial system, in the lower courts and in the Supreme Court, is
increasingly acknowledging international and foreign law. 89 The most
striking example of this is the United States Supreme Court's recent
decision in Lawrence v. Texas, citing several opinions of the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR). 90 United States Supreme Court justices

Reus-Smit, supranote 19, at 576-77.
at 591.
86 Koskenniemi, supra note 12, at 455.
87 The "Community of Courts" paradigm envisions "a global community of law,
established not by the World Court in The Hague, but by national courts
working together around the world,. . a shift from deference to dialogue, from
passive acceptance to active interaction, from negative comity to positive
comity." Anne-Marie Slaughter, JudicialGlobalization,40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103,
1114 (2000) [hereinafter "Slaughter Essay"].
88
1d. at 1112-13.
89 1d. at 166-69.
See also Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of
84

85 Id

Justification. Toward a Theory of ComparativeConstitutionalInterpretation,74
IND. L.J. 819, 819 (1999), cited in Slaughter Essay, supra note 87 at 117.

90 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572-77, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2481-2483 (2003)
(citing Dudgeon v United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H. R. (1981); P. G. & J. H. v
United Kingdom, App. No. 00044787/98, 56 (Eur. Ct. H.R., Sept. 25, 2001);
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are also meeting with their European colleagues, from national
constitutional courts and the European Court of Justice (ECJ), with
increasing regularity. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor has led Supreme
Court delegations to meet with their counterparts in France, Germany
and England. There have also been two official meetings between the
United States Supreme Court and the ECJ, one in 1998 in Brussels and
another in 2000 in Washington.9' In a very telling move, Chief Justice
Rehnquist recently created a branch of the federal judiciary exclusively
dealing with foreign policy issues, to "coordinate the federal judiciary's
relationship with foreign judiciaries and with official and unofficial
agencies and organizations interested in international judicial relations
and the establishment and expansion of the rule of law and
administration of justice. 9 2 The combination of these events represents
a considerable change in American-European judicial relations and a
substantial broadening of American judicial focus.
An accurate
assessment of the overall Euro-American relationship should recognize
these developments.
Thus, the fields of IR and IL have grown and developed
significantly since the IR realists and IL utopians of the post-war period
talked past each other. In addition to the important recognition IR
regime theory provided to IL, the past decade has brought a new wave of
scholars working to unite the two disciplines. Kagan bypasses all of
these new developments, proposing an analysis stuck in post-World War
II realism. By restating the post World War II realist argument without
acknowledging the subsequent responses by neo-realists, regime
theorists, liberals, or others, Kagan's work is narrowly revisionist.
IV.
Kagan's Book as Integrationist Contribution
In the chapters "The Postmodern Paradise" and "The World
America Made," Kagan asserts the central thesis of his book: "Europe's
evolution into its present state occurred under the mantle of the U.S.

Modinos v Cyprus, 259 Eur. Ct. H. R. (1993); Norris v Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.
R. (1988)).
91 Slaughter Essay, supra note 87, at 1120.
92 Id. at 1122-23 (citing Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm, International
Judicial
Relations Committee Promotes Communication, Coordination, I INT'L JUD.
OBSERVER 1 (Federal Judicial Center & American Society of International Law,

Washington, D.C.) (Sept. 1995)).
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security guarantee and could not have occurred without it.",93 Although it
is difficult to fully substantiate Kagan's claim that Europe's international
legal regime developed "but for" the presence of U.S.-provided security,
he is right to point out the extent to which Europe has relied on U.S.
security and the extent to which it will need to outgrow this reliance if it
is to complement its ever-more-important doctrinal strength.9 4 It is this
compelling hypothesis perhaps more than anything else that caused
Kagan's essay and (subsequently) his book to raise so many eyebrows in
international law and policy circles. Rather than viewing Kagan's
assertions as challenges to the IL-focused European premise, it is more
constructive to view them as an integrationist refinement on the current
successful European international legal regime. Kagan's book could
challenge international lawyers to more carefully consider the ways in
which military and doctrinal powers interact. It is premature to say, as
some international lawyers might, that there is no place in today's global
order for military force. Yet, it is also wrong to claim, as Kagan does,
that doctrinal/political force is completely hollow shell without military
force to back it up. Present-day Europe disproves both of these notions,
93 KAGAN, supra note

2, at 72. For example, Kagan argues that "[few] like to

recall that the military destruction of Nazi Germany was the prerequisite for the

European peace that followed." Id at 56. Similarly, he argues that "France's
willingness to risk the reintegration of Germany into Europe-and France was,
to say the last, highly dubious--depended on the promise of continued
American involvement in Europe as a guarantee against any resurgence of
German Militarism. Id. at 73. There is most certainly an element of truth in
both of these claims. This thesis that European normative power could not exist
without U.S.-provided security is similar yet analytically distinct from Kagan's
argument explored in Part II that U.S.-provided security allows Europeans to
choose normative power. Whereas Part II is an argument about political choice
of European voters or constituencies, the argument explored in this Part expands
this theme beyond political choice to geo-political reality. They are analyzed
separately because they present different issues: whereas Kagan's argument as
to political choice in Part II is problematic, his more general geo-political
argument is much more compelling.
94 See Anthony Browne et al., European leaders deny defence threat
to NA TO,
TIMES (London), Oct. 18, 2003, at 4 (quoting Silvio Berlusconi, then Prime

Minister of Italy, as saying, "The European Union can't play a central role on the
world stage without the back-up of an appropriate and adequate military forceit's inconceivable that Britain could be a world power with an autonomous
military capacity ....No diplomacy can exist without military strength. We
have lived under the American military umbrella. The time has come to foot our

own bill.").
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providing a third paradigm where both military and doctrinal force
matter (contrary to the view of international lawyers), but where
doctrinal force is the condition precedent to military force and not the
other way around (contrary to the realist view).
Europe's political and doctrinal strength and legitimacy has been
steadily growing since the formation of the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC) in 195 1.95 Only in recent months, however, has
Europe begun to seriously approach the question of common security as
a step towards further political cohesion. Silvio Berlusconi, the Prime
Minister of Italy when it held the presidency of the European Council,
noted that "apparently, all the EU countries are aware that there cannot
be any genuine foreign policy if there is not also a European military
capability that is independent and complementary to NATO. 96
Similarly, French President Jacques Chirac stated that "[t]here is no
Europe if it does not have the capacity to defend itself."97
Examples of increased European military planning and activity
are multiplying rapidly.
The first-ever independent European
peacekeeping forces were deployed in May 2003 to the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. 98 Perhaps more importantly from the standpoint
of geo-politics are the discussions aimed at establishing a European force
that goes beyond peacekeeping missions and would be capable of
operating independent of NATO. 99 Whereas other areas, particularly
95 See Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18,
1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 167.
96
lnter-GovernmentalConference:

Presidency/Parliament/Commission

in

United Front on Institutions, EUR. REP. (Oct. 25, 2003).
97 John Tagliabue, Blair Reassures U.S. on European Defense, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Oct. 18, 2003, at 3. See also Thomas Fuller & Brian Knowlton,
Europeans Try to Reassure US. on NATO, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 22, 2003,

at 7 (quoting Chirac as having said, "We have decided to pursue this project [of
a European military force] because we think that there will not be a Europe
without a defense capacity.").

Helle Dale, EU Army to the Rescue? Heaven Help Us From Our Friends,
WASH. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2003, at A21.
99 See William Pfaff, A History Lesson for the Allies: NATO's Future, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Oct. 23, 2003, at 4; Amid NATO Row, Blair Says Europe Must
Have Own Defence, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Oct. 23, 2003 ("British Prime Minister
Tony Blair insisted ... that Europe must have its own defence capability [but
98

attempted to quell U.S. fears about the independent force by saying] 'I'm
absolutely the strongest ally the US can have but I know there will be certain
situations that, for perfectly good reasons, when [sic] the US doesn't want to
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voting allocations, have stalled the drafting of Europe's Constitution,' 0 0
the delegates to the intergovernmental Conference (IGC) have agreed on
the provisions of the Constitution establishing a common defense policy
separate from NATO.' 0' These changes are a marked break from the
political choice to avoid military strength, discussed in Part II, but also
weaken Kagan's claim that "[t]oday, the European Union is no closer to
fielding
an independent force, even a small one, than it was three years
0
ago.

102

undertake military operation"') [hereinafter NATO Row]; European Defence:
Divide and Fall,ECONOMIST, Oct. 25, 2003, at 13-14; Fuller & Knowlton, supra
note 97; Thomas Fuller & Brian Knowlton, Europe Allies Try to Reassure US.:
They Say NATO Won't be Undercut, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 21, 2003, at 1;
Tagliabue, supra note 97 (noting Tony Blair's statement that "[t]here are going
to be circumstances, we have them now in Macedonia, where America for one
reason or another does not want to be involved."); John Tagliabue, Europe
Weighs Joint Defense, With a Nod to US. Concerns, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2003,
at A4; Stefania Bianchi, US Wants Guarantees on European Military Force,
INTER PRESS SERVICE, Oct. 22, 2003 (noting that at a September meeting in
Berlin, "the leaders of Europe's 'big three'-France, Germany and Britainagreed on a joint paper which sketches plans for the new initiative. The joint
paper stated that the E.U. 'should be endowed with a joint capacity to plan and
conduct operations without recourse to NATO resources and capabilities."').
1'0 See infra note 121.
101
Fuller, supra note 46. See also Dale, supra note 98; NATO Row, supra note
99 ("[D]efence plans [are] linked to talks on a first-ever constitution for the
enlarging bloc"); Tagliabue, supra note 97 (noting that the "European
constitution.., proposes, among other measures, the establishment of the office
of European foreign minister, who would be broadly responsible for foreign and
security policy."); Inter-governmentalConference: Silvio BerlusconiPledges to
Secure Institutional Compromise in December, EUROPEAN REPORT, Oct. 18,
2003.
102 KAGAN, supra note 2, at 53.
Even at the time Kagan wrote his book, his
claim was spurious. In 2001, the RAND study stated that
[t]hrough NATO and the DCI [Defense Capability Initiative],
and through the ESDP [European Security and Defense
Policy], European members of NATO, as well as the nonNATO members of the E.U., have expressed their intention
and commitment to enhance Europe's military capabilities.
The result of their doing so could be a more balanced sharing
of security burdens and responsibilities within NATO and, if
circumstances warrant, a capacity for independent action by
the E.U.
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The American government has become increasingly concerned
about these events. It views the proposal to locate the E.U. force's
headquarters outside Brussels (NATO headquarters) as a serious threat to
trans-Atlantic relations.10 3 The increased concern shown by the U.S.
government about European military development is difficult to square
with Kagan's final chapter, in which he presents increased European
military capabilities as a solution to the transatlantic divide.10 4 The
current trans-Atlantic tension over a European force is evidence that,
05
rather than acting to preserve "the West," as Kagan predicts it would,'
such a force will only increase the extent that the United States and
Europe are becoming "positively estranged.' 0 6 Kagan predicts that,
amidst this divide, the United States will choose to ignore a Europe for
which it no longer has any use.' 0 7 Instead, it appears that the U.S. is
08
paying a great deal of attention to what Europe is doing.
In conclusion, although this book review has been critical of the
manner in which Kagan ignores doctrinal power, international lawyers

RAND study, supra note 21, at 3.
103 Dale, supra note 98 ("U.S. NATO Ambassador Nick Burns called the plans
for a EU military headquarters 'the most serious threat to the future of NATO.'
And Secretary of State Colin Powell is reportedly preparing to travel to Europe
in November to stress the seriousness of Americans concerns with E.U.
leaders."); NATO Row, supra note 99 ("[A] U.S. envoy warned that certain E.U.
defence plans were a 'significant threat' to the future of the 19-member NATO
alliance."); Browne et al., supra note 94.
104KAGAN, supra note 2, at 100-01.
'05 Id.at 101.

106 Pfaff, supra note 99 (describing how "for the Western Europeans,
everything
has changed since the Iraq war," and that nascent plans for a European force
capable of operating independently of NATO are akin to "a European
declaration of independence" from NATO and U.S. control). For use of the
term "positively estranged" by Kagan, see KAGAN, supra note 2, at 100.

107 Id. ("The United States could become less inclined to listen [to Europe], or
perhaps even to care [about it]. The day could come, if it has not already, when
Americans might no more heed the pronouncements of the E.U. than they do the
pronouncements of ASEAN or the Andean Pact."); Id.at 102 ("American
leaders should realize that they are hardly constrained at all, that Europe is not
really capable of constraining the United States.").
108 This is consistent with the RAND study, supra note 21, at 3 (predicting
that
increased European military commitment and cohesion "will significantly
influence the character of U.S.-European security relations during the next
decade").
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risk committing just as big a gaffe by ignoring other forms of power,
such as military force. Professor Anne Orford notes that international
lawyers are already recognizing alternative forms of power to an
increasing extent: "The structure of international argument has swung
between apologetic or pragmatic approaches to the fact that international
lawyers have to be realistic about where power lies and idealistic
approaches that make great claims for the possibility that international
law can constrain such power."' 0 9 This is a positive trend, and to the
extent that Kagan's book adds a pragmatic voice to the integrationist
literature, it is a valuable tool for the international legal scholar.
V.

Conclusion: The European-American Rift as Integrationist
Project
Kagan cautions against the idealist European who fails to
acknowledge the unique geo-political conditions that led to the rise of the
European Union." 10 Yet, he risks committing as big an error by focusing
solely on these factors, unnecessarily downplaying the resulting
international legal regime."' For example, he claims that "the early
promise of the 'new' Europe... bonding together into a single political
and economic unit . . . to recapture Europe's old greatness in a new

political form [as] ... the next superpower," 112 has been unfulfilled. But,
109 Orford, supra note 13, at 521 n.131 (citing MARTrI

KOSKENNIEMI,

FROM

APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT

(1989)).
110 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
"'1 Europe may have begun through the serendipitous combination of geo-

political factors, but its international legal regime continues to endure, and
strengthen, even as factors change, leading Professor Shaw to note that
the E.U. either already is (in legal terms at least) beyond
sovereignty and therefore post-Hobbesian, or at least it will
become so in the near future. What [is meant] by postHobbesian is that the E.U. would be beyond the "well-known
Hobbesian dogma that for order to exist there must be a
hierarchical coercive structure to keep man in awe."
Jo Shaw, Sovereignty and European Integration, at http://www.europeanbooks.
org/europeanbooks/bookreviews/ bookreviews_12.htm (last visited Jan. 31,
2005) (reviewing and citing MARLENE WIND, SOVEREIGNTY AND EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION 80 (2001)).
112 KAGAN, supra note 2, at 20-21.
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to the international lawyer, the new Europe has made the world a very
different place indeed. Whereas Kagan spends several pages discussing
the "decline of Europe into relative military weakness,"" 3 the
international lawyer is equally impressed by Europe's relative doctrinal
strength. Europe is now building a norm-based international society (and
encouraging other countries to do the same) without the help of (or even
in opposition to) the United States.' 4 The European Union, established
only a half-century ago with a simple treaty between nations over coal
and steel tariffs,'"' has quickly become the world's "leading example of
actual organic integration." ' 6 Today, the European Union is the
quintessential example of the positive potential of international law. The
E.U. treaties represent "some sort of 'third way' between the strictures of
7
both national and international law.""1
After downplaying European doctrinal power throughout his
book, Kagan finally discusses the potential global influence of these
European changes in his chapter entitled "Is it Still "The West?" In that
chapter, Kagan notes that as European strategy focuses increasingly
"3 Id. at 22-25.
114 Maria Gavouneli, InternationalLaw Aspects of the European Union, 8 TUL.
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 147 (2000) ("There is no question that one of the primary

players acting in the international scene today is the regional economic
integration organization of the European states in its manifold manifestations.").
"' Id. at 148.

John H. Barton, InternationalLaw: Two Ideas of InternationalOrganization,
82 MICH. L. REV. 1520, 1531 (1984). See generally ERIC STEIN, P. HAY & M.
116

WAELBROECK,

EUROPEAN

COMMUNITY

LAW

AND

INSTITUTIONS

IN

(1976); Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a
TransnationalConstitution, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1981), cited in Barton, supra.
It was Professor Eric Stein of the University of Michigan who first began
studying Europe within the paradigm of a growing federalist system as opposed
to an international organization of sovereign states.
"17 Shaw, supra note 111.
See also VOLKER ROBEN, CONSTITUTIONALISM OF
INVERSE HIERARCHY: THE CASE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (Jean Monnet Ctr. for
Int'l and Econ. L. & Just., Working Paper No. 8/03, 2003), at
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/03/030801.html (describing the E.U.
as a complex, three-tiered constitutional government with an inverted hierarchy
in which member states, through their executive organs and courts, act at the
lowest level to carry out E.U. policies and, through heads of state assembled in
the European Council, national constitutional courts and national parliaments,
act at the highest level in their treaty-making capacity, leaving the E.U./E.C.
occupying a middle level).
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around the E.U. and less around NATO, it becomes progressively more
difficult to view Europe and the United States as a cohesive unit under
such titles as "The West."'" 8 His questions about the possible future of
this divide created by a doctrinally-strong Europe and a militarily-strong
United States will likely prove to be the book's most lasting contribution.
His answers, however, are heavily value-laden with his realist premise.19
Whereas Kagan views Europe as destined to merely "follow where
America leads,"'120 the international lawyer, concerned with international
doctrinal power, views Europe as the leader. Endogenously, this power
manifests itself, most recently, in the project for a European Constitution
21
and the development of a common strategic and defense policy.'
Exogenously, this power becomes more evident as the European Union
expands from 15 to 25 members, exercises substantial control over
22
policy decisions in the growing number of E.U. candidate countries,'
increases its use of powerful association agreements, 23 and continues to
supra note 2, at 85.
Id.at 97 ("The task, for both Europeans and Americans, is to readjust to the
new reality of American hegemony").
120 Id.at 96.
121William Pfaff, Moral choices in Europe. E.U Expansion, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Sept. 11, 2003, at 8.
Although efforts to establish a European
Constitution were stalled in December 2003 because of prolonged discussion
over voting allocations, they will resume in 2004. European Constitution
Summit Collapses, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2003 (noting that Prime Minister Tony
Blair felt that "differences could be overcome and the constitution adopted, but
[that] ...leaders would take at least several months before a breakthrough," and
quoting Blair as stating, "I don't think there's any point to rushing this before we
have the basis of an agreement"). Interestingly, even the voting impasse itself is
evidence of Europe's role as counterweight to the United States. See John
Vinocur, Europeans Stress the Positive in Breakdown of Talks, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 14, 2003 (noting that the voting debacle "hinged on the constitutional
draft's provision to reduce the voting rights of Spain and Poland, seen as faithful
allies of the United States, and together capable of forming the basis of a
blocking minority").
122 Id. (referring to Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey, and mentioning
further
expansion possibilities in the former Soviet bloc states). See also Kahn, supra
note 14, at 18 ("The European Union confronts a large number of states that
want to enter, even though entry will require a reordering of the relationship
among the conceptions of state, sovereignty, and law.").
123See, e.g., Helen E. Hartnell, Subregional Coalescence in European
Regional
Integration, 16 WIS. INT'L L.J. 115, 121 (1997) (noting that "the increase in
number and types of association agreement [sic] since 1989 has been
118 KAGAN,
19
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exercise tremendous power over its former colonial holdings in Africa,
Asia, and the Pacific. William Pfaff notes, "American neo-conservatives
...who formerly dismissed the E.U. as a grouping of over-regulated and
non-competitive economies, now have begun to issue warnings against
'superpower Europe."" 2 4
Against these developments, Kagan's assertion of "insecurity in
the European claim to success"1 25 seems difficult to substantiate. There
is no question that Europe exercises substantial global power. 26 This
power may not be as strong as that possessed by the United States, and it
certainly manifests itself in a different form. Nevertheless, it is
undeniably present. Rather than becoming mired in a discussion over
which form of power is superior, the way forward is to recognize the
important interaction of various forms of power: military, doctrinal, or
otherwise. Kagan has presented his work in the former narrow sense, but
it could equally be used in the broader sense, as an integrationist tool.
This is no easy task, but a group of committed scholars are meeting the
challenge, merging the disciplines of IR and IL with particular finesse
and discretion. By offering its decidedly realist viewpoint, Kagan's
work, somewhat ironically, can add to this discourse.

dramatic"); George Soros, A Chance ForSoft Power, FIN. TIMES, May 23, 2003,
at 13 (calling association agreements one of the E.U.'s "main policy
instruments").
124 William Pfaff, Change Imminent for EU, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE (W.Va.),
Sept. 14, 2003, at P2C (noting that "for the first time since the Reformation, the
unity of European civilization has been recaptured").

KAGAN, supra note 2, at 61-62 ("America's power and its willingness to
exercise that power-unilaterally if necessary-constitute a threat to Europe's
new
sense of mission.").
126 See supra notes 122-24.
125

